This paper studies a coalition formation game subject to the capacity of K participants per coalition. The participants in each coalition are supposed to split the associated cost according to a given cost sharing solution. A stable coalition structure is established, when no group of participants can opt out to form another coalition that leads to lower individual payments. We investigate the strong price of anarchy (PoA) comparing a worst-case stable coalition structure and a social optimum considering several fair cost sharing solutions (e.g., equal-split, proportional-split, egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions of bargaining games, and usage based cost sharing). Our coalition formation game is motivated by applications in sharing economy, where users form coalitions to share certain replaceable resources. Our model can be applied to several problems such as hotel room sharing among travelers, taxi-ride sharing among passengers, and pass sharing among users. We show that the strong PoA for equal-split, proportional-split, and usage based cost sharing (under certain conditions) is Θ(log K), whereas the one for egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions is O( √ K log K). We also study the existence of a stable coalition structure in these cost sharing solutions.
Introduction
Coalition formation underpins a wide range of economic behavior, which has been extensively studied in traditional cooperative game theory. Recently, the rise of "sharing economy" [20] has created a new paradigm of economic behavior, which promotes distributed peer-to-peer economic interactions bypassing traditional centralized hierarchal service providers, governance, and intermediaries. Sharing economy is often facilitated by the advent of pervasive information technology platforms, especially by mobile computing and social networks. In such situations, one requires an effective coalition formation mechanism for sharing resources, facilities and services with excess capacity among users collaboratively and efficiently. In particular, we study the following the sharing economy examples:
1. Hotel Room Sharing: Travelers are motivated to share hotel rooms with other fellow travelers, because multiple-occupancy rooms are more economical. The sharing operations can be achieved through private arrangements among travelers.
1. There is a capacity per each coalition such that not all participants can form a single coalition.
Hence, there will exist multiple coalition structures and the self-interested participants will opt for the lower cost payments. Self-interested behavior can give rise to outcomes that deviate from a social optimum. The strong Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a common metric in algorithmic game theory that compares the worst-case ratio between the self-interested outcomes (that allow any group of users to deviate jointly) and a social optimum [16] .
2. Sharing economy can be regarded as an alternative to the for-profit sector, which resembles cooperative organizations and favors distributive justice. When participants share the costs, there is a notion of fairness. First, we consider typical fair cost sharing concepts such as equalsplit, proportional-split, and usage based cost sharing. Second, we can formulate the cost sharing problem as a bargaining game. Thus, the well-known bargaining game solutions (e.g., egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions) [17] can be applied.
In this paper, a comprehensive study is presented for the strong PoA of a general model of coalition formation, considering diverse fair cost sharing solutions. Strong Price Θ(log K) Θ(log K) O( √ K log K) Ω(K) (in general) of Anarchy Θ(log K) (under certain conditions)
Our Contributions
We consider K-capacitated coalitions, where K is the maximum number of sharing participants per each coalition. A stable coalition structure, wherein no group of participants can opt out to form another coalition that leads to lower individual payments, is a likely self-interested outcome. The results in this paper are summarized as follows (and in Table 1 ). possible to form arbitrary coalitions independent from others. Our model allows us to derive strong price of anarchy bounds for diverse cost sharing solutions, whereas only specific cost sharing solutions (e.g., the Shapley value) have been considered so far in general network cost sharing games.
It is also worth mentioning how our results of usage based cost sharing relate to cost sharing with anonymous cost functions in network design games [1] or connection games [9] . On the one hand, our model is simpler as we do not assume connectivity requirements in a network, but only an abstract setting that allows arbitrary coalitions up to a certain capacity (but we allow non-anonymous cost functions). On the other hand, one of the cost sharing solutions we consider (i.e., usage based cost sharing) resembles in some sense that used in [1, 9] if we interpret the resources used by one participant as his chosen path or tree in the network design game. Similar to the case in [1] (with respect to strong Nash equilibrium), a usage based cost sharing solution may not admit a stable coalition structure. Noteworthily, the strong price of anarchy in usage based cost sharing in our model can increase as a linear function of K. Nonetheless, we provide general sufficient conditions for usage based cost sharing to induce logarithmic strong price of anarchy.
Model
This section presents a general model of coalition formation game for sharing certain resources. Consider an n-participant cooperative game in coalition form. The coalitions formed by the subsets of participants are associated with a real-valued cost function. The participants in a coalition are supposed to split the cost according to a certain payment function. However, as a departure from traditional cooperative games, there is a capacity per each coalition, such that not all participants can form a single coalition. Hence, when given a payment function, the participants will opt for coalitions that lead to lower individual payments subject to a capacity per coalition.
Problem Formulation
The set of n participants is denoted by N . A coalition structure is a partition of N denoted by P ⊂ 2 N , such that G∈P G = N and G 1 ∩ G 2 = ∅ for any distinct pair G 1 , G 2 ∈ P. Let the set of all partitions of N be P. Each element G ∈ P is called a coalition. The collection of singleton coalitions, P self {{i} : i ∈ N }, is called the default coalition structure, wherein no one forms a coalition with others. This paper considers arbitrary coalition structures with at most K participants per coalition, which is motivated by scenarios of sharing replaceable resources; see Section 3.2 for examples. The notion of resources will be introduced later in Sec. 3.1.2, and our model does not always rely on the notion of resources. In practice, K is often much less than n. Let P K {P ∈ P : |G| ≤ K for each G ∈ P} be the set of feasible coalition structures, such that each coalition consists of at most K participants.
Cost Function and Social Optimum
A cost c(G) (also known as a characteristic function) is assigned to each coalition of participants G ∈ P ∈ P K , subject to the following properties:
The total cost of coalition structure P is denoted by c(P) G∈P c(G). For brevity, we also denote c({i}) by c i , where c i is called the default cost of participant i, that is, when i forms no coalition with others. When a subset of participants are indexed by N = {i 1 , i 2 , ..., i j } ⊆ N , we simply denote the corresponding default costs by {c 1 , c 2 , ..., c j }.
A K-capacitated social optimum is a coalition structure P * K ∈ P K that minimizes the total cost:
When K = 2, a social optimum P * K can be found in polynomial time by reducing the coalition formation problem to a (general graph) matching problem. When K > 2, K-MinCoalition is an NP-hard problem (see Sec. 6).
Canonical Resources
There is often a resource being shared by each coalition (e.g., a hotel room, a taxicab, a pass). The resources are usually replaceable from a large pool of available resources in the sharing economy. Hence, any subset of participants can always form a coalition using separate resources, independent from other coalitions. For each coalition G, we consider a canonical resource, which is a class of replaceable resources that can satisfy G, rather than any specific resource. The canonical resource shared by a coalition will not be affected by the canonical resources shared by other coalitions. Because of the consideration of canonical resources, our model exhibits different properties than the network sharing games with limited resources [10, 11, 18] .
Let R(G) be the feasible set of canonical resources that can satisfy coalition G. It is naturally assumed that R(H) ⊇ R(G), when H ⊆ G, because the canonical resources that can satisfy a larger coalition G should also satisfy a smaller coalition H (by ignoring the participants in G\H). Each canonical resource r ∈ R(G) is characterized by a cost c r , and a set of involved facilities F (r). Each facility f ∈ F (r) carries a cost c f , such that f ∈F (r) c f = c r . We do not require that every participant of G utilizes the same facilities. Let F i (r) ⊆ F (r) be the set of facilities utilized by participant i ∈ G, when r is shared by G. Let r(G) ∈ arg min r∈R(G) {c r } be the lowest cost canonical resource for coalition G. Hence, we set c(G) = c r(G) and monotonicity is satisfied. If there are multiple lowest cost canonical resources, one is selected by a certain deterministic tie-breaking rule.
Motivating Examples
We present a few motivating examples in sharing economy to illustrate the aforementioned model.
Hotel Room Sharing
Consider N as a set travelers to share hotel rooms. Each traveler i ∈ N is associated with a tuple (t in i , t out i , A i ), where t in i is the arrival time, t out i is the departure time, and A i is the area of preferred locations of hotels. Let K be the maximum number of travelers that can share a room. A canonical resource is a room booking r, associated with a tuple (t in r , t out r , a r ), where t in r is the check-in time, t out r is the check-out time, and a r is the hotel location. We assume that there is a large pool of available rooms for each location, and we do not consider a specific room. The feasible set R(G) is a set of room bookings shared by a coalition of travelers G, if the following conditions are satisfied:
2. a r ∈ i∈G A i ;
3. t in r ≤ t in i and t out r ≥ t out i for all i ∈ G.
(Note that the monotonicity assumption is satisfied: R(H) ⊇ R(G), when H ⊆ G.) In this example, F (r) is be the set of days during [t in r , t out r ] for room booking r, and F i (r) be the set of days that i stays in room booking r. For each f ∈ F (r), c f is the hotel rate of day f .
Taxi-ride Sharing
Consider N as a set of passengers to share taxi-rides. Each passenger i ∈ N is associated with a tuple (v . .., t m ) in an increasing order. We assume that there is a large pool of available taxicabs, and we do not consider a specific taxicab. The feasible set R(G) is a set of rides shared by a coalition of travelers G, if the following conditions are satisfied:
is the arrival timeslot of ride r at location v.
Note that the hotel room sharing problem may be regarded as a one-dimensional version of the taxiride sharing problem, if the preferred location constraint is not considered, and we let each tuple (t in i , t out i ) in hotel room sharing problem be the source and destination locations. Let F (r) is the set of road segments traversed by ride r, and F i (r) be the set of road segments that i travels in ride r. For each f ∈ F (r), let c f be the taxi fare for road segment f .
Pass Sharing
Consider N as a set of regular-pass holders who want to form coalitions to share some anonymous passes. Each user i ∈ N is associated with a set of required usage timeslots T i . Let K be the maximum number of sharing users, so as to limit the hassle of circulating the pass. A canonical resource is a pass r, associated with a set of allowable timeslots T r . We assume that there is a large pool of available passes, and we do not consider a specific pass. The feasible set R(G) is a set of passes shared by a coalition of travelers G, if the following conditions are satisfied:
e., no one overlaps in their required timeslots);
This setting also applies to sharing physical properties (e.g., houses, cars and parking lots).
Let F (r) are the set of timeslots required by pass r, and c f be the cost of each timeslot in F (r). A user needs to cover the cost when he uses the pass or shares the cost with other participants when no one uses it. Hence, let F i (r) = T i ∪ T r \( j∈G T j ) , when i shares pass r in coalition G.
Cost Sharing
A coalition of participants G are supposed to share the cost c(G). Let the cost (or payment) contributed by participant i ∈ G be p i (G). The utility of participant i is given by:
The following natural properties can be satisfied by payment function p i (·):
• Non-negative Payment: p i (·) is said to be non-negative, if p i (G) ≥ 0 for every G ∈ P ∈ P K . If non-positive payment is allowed, then it possible that p i (G) < 0 for some i ∈ G.
This paper considers the following fair cost sharing solutions. Note that only usage based cost sharing solution takes into account the notion of resources, while the other cost sharing solutions do not rely on the notion of resources.
1. Equal-split Cost Sharing: The cost is split equally among all participants: for i ∈ G,
2. Proportional-split Cost Sharing: The cost is split proportionally according to the participants' default costs: for i ∈ G,
This approach is also called Matthew's effect in [3] .
3. Bargaining Based Cost Sharing: One can formulate the cost sharing problem as a bargaining game with a feasible set and a disagreement point. In our model, the feasible set is the set of utilities (u i ) i∈G , such that i∈G
The disagreement point is (u i = 0) i∈G , such that each participant pays only the respective default cost. There are two bargaining solutions in the literature [17] :
(i) Egalitarian bargaining solution is given by:
Namely, every participant in each coalition has the same utility:
for all i ∈ G. Note that non-positive payment is possible because it may need to compensate those with low default costs to reach equal utility at every participant 3 .
(ii) Nash bargaining solution is given by:
subject to
One can impose an additional constraint of non-negative payments:
Usage Based Cost Sharing:
We consider a cost sharing solution that takes into account the usage structure of resources of participants. Recall that r(G) denotes a lowest cost canonical resource for coalition G. Let N f (r(G)) be the set of participants that share the same facility f in r(G). The cost is split equally among the participants who utilize the same facilities:
For example, in taxi-ride sharing, passengers will split the cost equally for each road segment with those passengers traveled together in the respective road segment. Usage based cost sharing is also called Shapley cost sharing in [1] .
Stable Coalition and Strong Price of Anarchy
Consider a certain payment function p i (·). A coalition of participants G is called a blocking coalition with respect to coalition structure P if all participants in G can strictly reduce their payments if they form a coalition G to share the cost instead. A coalition structure is called stable coalition structure, denoted byP K ∈ P K , if there exists no blocking coalition with respect toP K . The existence of a stable coalition structure depends on the cost sharing solution (see Sec. 5).
Note that a stable coalition structure is also a strong Nash equilibrium 4 in our model. However, there is a difference between the case of sharing canonical resources and that of limited resources. For sharing canonical resources, an additional member can join certain an existing coalition to create a larger coalition, only if all of the participants in the new coalition will not be worse-off after the change. Otherwise, the existing coalition can always reject the additional member by keeping the current canonical resource. However, for sharing limited resources, a coalition may be forced to accept an additional member, even they will be worse-off, because they cannot find a new resource to share with. In this case, a strong Nash equilibrium may not be a stable coalition structure.
Define the strong Price of Anarchy (PoA) as the worst-case ratio between the cost of a stable coalition structure and that of a social optimum over any feasible costs subject to (C1)-(C2):
Specifically, the strong price of anarchy when using specific cost sharing solutions are denoted by PoA
Strong Price of Anarchy
This section derives the strong PoA considering different cost sharing solutions. The K-th harmonic number is denoted by
Preliminary Results
Theorem 1. Recall the default coalition structure P self {i} : i ∈ N . We obtain
Consider a budget balanced payment function p i (·). LetP K be a respective K-capacitated stable coalition structure. Then,
Hence, the strong PoA for p i (·) is upper bounded by PoA K ≤ K.
Proof. First, by monotonicity, we obtain for any
Hence,
Since P * K is a stable coalition structure, then p i (G) ≤ c i for every G ∈ P * K . Otherwise, every i ∈ G can strictly reduce his payment by forming a singleton coalition individually.
Lastly, since p i (·) is a budget balanced payment function, it follows that
However, we will show that the strong PoA for various cost sharing solutions is
To derive an upper bound for the strong PoA, the following lemma provides a general tool. First, define the following notation for a non-negative payment function p i (·):
where
is a budget balanced non-negative payment function. Given a K-capacitated stable coalition structureP K , and a feasible coalition structure P ∈ P K , then
Thus, ifP K is a worst-case stable coalition structure and P = P * K is a social optimal coalition structure, then we obtain an upper bound for the strong PoA with respect to {p i (·)} i∈N : 
Note that [19] uses an approach called summability similar to that of Lemma 1. Informally, a payment function (or cost sharing solution) p i (·) is said to be α-summable if for every subset H of participants and every possible ordering σ on H, the sum of the payments of the participants as they are added one-by-one according to σ is at most α · c(H). However, [19] relies on the notion of cross-monotonicity for proving summability. A payment function p i (·) is said to satisfy crossmonotonicity, if for any G ⊆ G , p i (G ) ≤ p i (G). [18] showed that if a payment function satisfies cross-monotonicity in a network cost sharing game, then summability can bound the price of anarchy. Also, cross-monotonicity implies that a Nash equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, our model is simpler than network cost sharing games; Lemma 1 shows that α {p i (·)} can be used to bound PoA K without the assumption of cross-monotonicity. In particular, many payment functions may violate cross-monotonicity (e.g., egalitarian, Nash bargaining solution, equal-split and proportional-split), and hence, the approach in [19] will not apply to these payment functions.
Equal-split Cost Sharing
Theorem 2. For equal-split cost sharing, the strong PoA is upper bounded by
which follows from the monotonicity of cost function, c(H s ) ≤ c(H 1 ).
Tight Example
We present a tight example to show that PoA eq K = Θ(log K). In this tight example, there are K · K! participants, indexed by N = {i t s | t = 1, ..., K!, s = 1, ..., K}. When K = 3, the tight example is illustrated in Fig. 1 . 
The coalitions in orange dotted lines {Ĝ k s } are a stable coalition structure, whereas the coalitions in blue dashed lines {G * t } are a social optimum.
In general, for any non-empty subset G ⊆ N , we define the cost c(G) as follows:
.., i t K } for some t ∈ {1, ..., K}, then we set c(G) = 1.
} and s ∈ {1, ..., K}, then we set c(G) = 1. 
See an illustration in Fig. 1 , when K = 3. By equal-split cost sharing, if i t s ∈ G, then
.., i t s−1 }. One can check that {Ĝ k s } are a stable coalition structure, whereas {G * t } are a social optimum. Hence, the strong PoA is lower bounded by
Proportional-split Cost Sharing
Given cost function c(·), we define a truncated cost functionc(·) as follows:
Note thatc(G) ≤ j∈G c j for any G. Let PoA pp K (c(·)) be the strong PoA with respect to cost function c(·) specifically.
Lemma 2. For proportional-split cost sharing,
Proof. First, we show that ifP is a stable coalition structure, then for any G ∈P, we have c(G) ≤ j∈G c j . If we assume c(G) > j∈G c j for some G ∈P, then for all i ∈ G,
Namely, every i ∈ G can strictly reduce his payment by forming a singleton coalition individually. This is a contradiction to the fact thatP is a stable coalition structure. Second, we note that if P * is a social optimum, then for any G ∈ P * , we have c(G) ≤ j∈G c j . Otherwise, P * does not attain the least total cost by including G.
Therefore, we obtain 
where H s = {i s , ..., i K } for some i 1 , ..., i K ∈ N , with default costs denoted by {c s , ..., c K }.
, we obtain . Therefore,
which follows from Lemma 3 and cŝ ≤ 1.
Note that one can strengthen the strong PoA by PoA 
It follows that c s K t=s c t ≤ log(
Hence,ŝ 
Bargaining Game Based Cost Sharing
First, we show that the strong PoA for egalitarian bargaining solution and Nash bargaining solution (irrespective of the constraint of non-negative payments) are equivalent. However, there is a difficulty, when we apply Lemma 1 to obtain an upper bound for the strong PoA -we can only obtain an upper bound as O(K) by the payment function of egalitarian bargaining solution, whereas the payment function of Nash bargaining solution under the constraint of non-negative payments is not convenient to analyze. But we show a property in Nash bargaining solution, namely that there always exists a coalition structure that satisfies positive payments and its cost is at most ( √ K + 1) from that of a given coalition structure. We then obtain an upper bound as O( √ K log K) for the strong PoA using this property.
Equivalence between Egalitarian and Nash Bargaining Solutions
Lemma 4. If the constraint of non-negative payments is not considered in Nash bargaining solution, then egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions are equivalent:
Proof. This follows from the fact that the feasible set of Nash bargaining solution is bounded by the hyperplane i∈G u i = i∈G c i − c(G). The maximal of i∈G u i (i.e., Nash bargaining solution) is attained at the point u i = u j for any i, j ∈ G.
Lemma 5. For Nash bargaining solution (irrespective of the constraint of non-negative payments), given a stable coalition structureP ∈ P K and G ∈P, then every participant has non-negative payment:
Namely, each stable coalition structure with the constraint of non-negative payments coincides with a stable coalition structure without the constraint of non-negative payments.
Proof. Consider a coalition G = {i 1 , ..., i K } ∈P, with default costs denoted by {c 1 , ..., c K }. We prove the statement by contradiction. Assume that p nash is (G) < 0 for some i s ∈ G. Then,
Thus, we obtain
where c(G\{i s }) ≤ c(G) by monotonicity of the cost function. For any i k = i s ,
Namely, all users in G\{i s } would reduce strictly their payments by switching to the coalition G\{i s }. This is a contradiction to the fact thatP is a stable coalition structure.
Corollary 1. For egalitarian bargaining solution and Nash bargaining solution (irrespective of the constraint of non-negative payments), their strong PoA are equivalent:
Proof. This follows from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
Given cost function c(·), we define a truncated cost functionc(·) by Eqn. (20) in Sec. 4.3, such thatc(G) ≤ j∈G c j for any G.
Lemma 6. For egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions (irrespective of the constraint of nonnegative payments), we obtain
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2. First, we show that ifP is a stable coalition structure, then for any G ∈P, we obtain c(G) ≤ t∈G c t based on a contradiction. If we assume c(G) > t∈G c t for some G ∈P, then for all i ∈ G,
This is a contradiction, sinceP cannot be a stable coalition structure. Second, we note that if P * is a social optimum, then for any G ∈ P * , we obtain c(G) ≤ t∈G c t . Therefore, by Corollary 1, we obtain PoA Lemma 8. Suppose c(G) ≤ j∈G c j for any G. Given any coalition structure P ∈ P K , there exists a coalition structureP ∈ P K , such that p nash i (G) > 0 for all i ∈ G ∈P, and c(P) ≤ (
Bounding Strong Price of Anarchy
Proof. Given coalition structure P, we construct coalition structureP as follows. For each G ∈ P, we sort the participants G = {i 1 , ..., i m } in the decreasing order of their default costs, such that
(35) where t ∈ {1, ..., R} and m 0 = 0. By monotonicity of c(·) and the ordering on c i , (35) implies that each i k ∈ N t satisfies
By Lemma 7, the above conditions can guarantee positive payments in Nash bargaining solution. We then replace each coalition G ∈ P by a collection of coalitions N 1 , ..., N R . We call such a coalition structureP.
Note that for each
where n t |N t | = m t − m t−1 . Without loss of generality, we assume c(G) = 1. Letc t c m t−1 +1 and C t c(N t ). It is evident to see that 1 ≥c 1 >c 2 > ... >c R > 0. Since c(G) ≤ j∈G c j for any G, C t ≤ n tct for all t ∈ {1, ..., K}.
We next upper bound R t=1 C t by the following optimization problem (S1):
where we assumec R+1 = 0. Since in (S1) the lower bounds on n t are only present in Constraints (40), we assume n t = Ct yt , where y t c t −c t+1 for t = 1, ..., R, and obtain (S2) max
Note that (S2) is simply a fractional knapsack problem. Suppose that (y t ) R t=1 are arranged in a non-increasing order, y 1 ≥ y 2 ≥ · · · ≥ y R . Let be the largest index such that
Then the optimal solution (C * t ) R t=1 to (S2) is given by Lemma 9. Hence, the optimal value of (S2) is
By the arithmetic mean-harmonic mean inequality (i.e., t=1 yt ≥ t=1 1 y t ), we obtain
Hence, it follows that ≤ √ K, and the maximum of (S2) is upper bounded by √ K + 1.
Therefore, this completes the proof by
Lemma 9. The fractional knapsack problem is defined by
Suppose that (y t ) R t=1 are positive and arranged in a non-increasing order, y 1 ≥ y 2 ≥ · · · ≥ y R . Let be the largest index such that
Then the optimal solution (C * t ) R t=1 to (FKP) is given by
Proof. The proof follows from a well-known result in knapsack problem (for example, see [15] Theorem 2.2.1).
Theorem 4. For egalitarian bargaining solution and Nash bargaining solution (irrespective of the constraint of non-negative payments), the strong PoA is upper bounded by
Proof. First, by Lemma 6, it suffices to consider egalitarian bargaining solution with cost function satisfying c(G) ≤ j∈G c j for any G. Next, by Lemma 8, there exists a coalition structureP, such that p nash i (G) > 0 for all i ∈ G ∈P, and c(P) ≤ ( √ K + 1) · c(P * K ), where P * K is a social optimum. For a stable coalition structureP K , 
The maximum of ( M1) is upper bounded by y * (K)
In Lemma 9, constraint (57) captures positive payment for every participant in H 1 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Usage Based Cost Sharing
Recall that r(G) is the lowest cost canonical resource for G, and F i (r(G)) is the set of facilities utilized by participant i ∈ G in canonical resource r(G). First, for each subset L ⊆ G, we define
Namely, X G (L) is the total cost of facilities of canonical resource r(G) that are only used by the coalition L exclusively. See Fig. 2 for an illustration of X G (L). Usage based payment function can be reformulated as
Given a set of participants {i 1 , ...i K } and H s {i s , ..., i K }, we simply write X s (L) X Hs (L).
In general, the strong price of anarchy of usage based cost sharing can be Ω(K). Proof. We construct a similar instance to the one in Sec. 4.2.1. There are K ·K! participants, indexed by N = {i t s | t = 1, ..., K, s = 1, ..., K!}. For any non-empty subset G ⊆ N and L ⊆ G, we define X G (L) as follows:
• If |G| > 1, then let s = min{s | i t s ∈ G}, and
See an illustration of an example for setting X G (L) in Fig. 3 . 
Case 3: Otherwise, G is a partition of m sets G = H 1 ∪ · · · ∪ H m , where each H t is a maximal subset that satisfies either case 1 or case 2. Then,
.., i t K }, where t ∈ {1, ..., K!}. One can check that {Ĝ k s } form a stable coalition structure, whereas {G * t } are a social optimum. Note that if
Therefore, the price of anarchy is lower bounded by
Monotone Utilization
Generally PoA ub K = Ω(K), but we next present a general sufficient condition for inducing PoA ub K = Θ(log K). The set of facilities utilized by participants F i (·) are said to satisfy monotone utilization, if for all H ⊆ G,
Namely, the total cost of facilities utilized by a subset of participants increases in a larger coalition. Note that monotone utilization condition implies monotonicity of cost function. For hotel room sharing problem, a set of days of a participant stays in a room booking does not depend on the coalition, and hence, F i (r(H)) = F i (r(G)). For taxi-ride sharing problem, one needs to travel a greater distance in order to pick-up and drop-off other passengers when sharing with more passengers, and hence, monotone utilization condition is satisfied. Although pass sharing problem does not generally satisfy monotone utilization condition, we will later prove that the strong PoA for pass sharing problem with uniform average cost is also Θ(log K).
Theorem 5. Consider usage based cost sharing, such that F i (·) satisfies the monotone utilization condition. Then PoA
Proof. Applying Lemma 1 with p i = p ub i , we obtain
where H s = {i s , ..., i K }, with the corresponding default costs denoted by {c s , ..., c K }. Without loss of generality, we assume c(
|L| . Note that the monotone utilization condition is equivalent to saying that, for all s ∈ {1, ..., K −1} and K ≥ t > s,
Hence, we can bound PoA ub K by the maximum value of the linear optimization problem (P1):
Then the dual problem to (P1) can be written as follows:
We next provide a primal-dual feasible pair (X * , λ * ) whose objective value is K s=1 1 s . To better understand this proof, it may be instructive to look at the example when K = 3 in Table 2 .
Primal solution:
For s ∈ {1, ..., K} and L ⊆ H s , we set
Also, we obtain
Hence, X * satisfies Constraint (69) and Constraint (70).
Dual solution:
We first claim that there is a set of numbers λ * (s, t) ≥ 0, for 1 ≤ s < t ≤ K that satisfy Constraint (74) as equalities. To show this, we study the linear optimization problem (D2):
λ(s, t) ≥ 0, for all 1 ≤ s < t ≤ K
and its dual:
(P2) max
By Constraint (84), the primal problem (P2) is bounded; it is also feasible since X * s (L) for s ∈ {2, ..., K} given in Eqn. (77) satisfies Constraint (83) and Constraint (84). It follows that the dual (D2) is also feasible and bounded, that is, there exist numbers λ * (s, t) satisfying Constraint (80).
Let
We claim that (λ * , z * ) is a feasible solution to the dual problem Eqn. (73). Evidently, we need only to check that it satisfies Constraint (75).
For L ⊆ H 1 , we sum the equations in Constraint (80) for L ∩ H t for all t ∈ {2, ..., K} to obtain
It follows that
Hence, Constraint (75) is satisfied.
Optimality:
Finally, the proof is completed by noting that Table 2 : (P1), (D1), (D2), (P2) for K = 3.
We can apply the same tight example in Sec. 4.2.1 to show that PoA 
Pass Sharing
Theorem 6. Consider usage based cost sharing for pass sharing problem with uniform average cost c f = 1. Then PoA
Proof. Recall that T i is the a set of required usage timeslots of user i, T r is the set allowable timeslots of pass r, and F i (r(G)) = T i ∪ T r \( j∈G T j ) . For pass sharing problem, we note that X G (L) = 0 if 1 < |L| < |G|. Hence,
Since the average cost c f = 1, X G ({i}) = |T i |, and 
Note thatX ≤ c(H 1 ) because of monotonicity of cost function, and
, because the coalition of users H 1 = {i 1 , ..., i K } cannot overlap in their required usage timeslots, which are within the allowable timeslots of a pass utilized in c(H 1 ). Therefore,
Existence of Stable Coalition
This section investigates the existence of stable coalition structure considering different cost sharing solutions. First, we define a cyclic preference as sequences (i 1 , ..., i s ) and (G 1 , ..., G s ), where
Lemma 11. If there exists no cyclic preference, there always exists a stable coalition structure. Furthermore, such a stable coalition structure can be found in time n O(K) .
Theorem 7. For equal-split cost sharing, there always exists a stable coalition structure.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 11. See the Appendix.
Theorem 8. For proportional-split cost sharing, there always exists a stable coalition structure.
Theorem 9. For egalitarian bargaining solution, there always exists a stable coalition structure.
Theorem 10. For Nash bargaining solution, there always exists a stable coalition structure, irrespective of the constraint of non-negative payments.
Proof. First, if the constraint of non-negative payments is not considered, then the existence of a stable coalition structure follows from Corollary 1 and Theorem 9. Second, if the constraint of non-negative payments is considered, then u i (p nash (i 1 , ..., i s ) and (G 1 , . .., G s ). Let H t ⊆ G t be the set of participants with positive payment in each G t , that is, p nash i (G t ) > 0 for all i ∈ H t . By Lemma 7, it follows that
. . .
Summing the above equations, one obtains a contradiction 0 > 0. This completes the proof by Lemma 11.
Usage Based Cost Sharing
In general, usage based cost sharing can induce cyclic preference, and hence, possibly the absence of a stable coalition structure. However, we can show the existence of a stable coalition structure in some special cases.
Pass Sharing
For any K ≥ 2, we can show that there always exists a stable coalition structure in the pass sharing problem, by ruling out any cyclic preference. Without loss of generality, we assume the average cost rate is 1 (i.e., c f = 1). If participants i ∈ G share a pass r, then i's payment is given by
If i prefers to share in coalition G with pass r rather than on G with pass r , then p ub
If there exists a cyclic preference defined by (i 1 , ..., i s ), (G 1 , ..., G s ) and (r 1 , ..., r s ), then
(101) This generates a contradiction. Hence, there always exists a stable coalition structure.
Hotel Room Sharing
When K = 2, we can show that there always exists a stable coalition structure, by ruling out any cyclic preference. Let τ i = t out i − t in i be the interval length required by participant i, and τ i,j be the length of the overlapped interval, if participants i, j share a room. Without loss of generality, we assume the room rate is 1. Then, i's payment is given by
If i prefers to share with j rather than k, then p ub i ({i, j}) < p ub i ({i, k}), namely, τ i,j > τ i,k . If there exists a cyclic preference (i 1 , ..., i s ), then
This generates a contradiction. Hence, there always exists a stable coalition structure.
Taxi-ride Sharing
There exists an instance with no stable coalition structure even for K = 2, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . Participant i k can share a ride with participant i k−1 or participant i k+1 (whereas participant i s can share with i s−1 or participant i 1 ). Let the cost from v s is to v d
) and c(v s
Hence, participant i k prefers to share with participant i k+1 , rather than with participant i k−1 . This generates a cyclic preference (i 1 , ..., i s ). If there are odd number of participants arranged in a loop, then this can give no stable coalition structure. We remark that Eqn. (104) can be attained, when s is sufficiently large. 
NP-hardness
This section studies the hardness of solving K-MinCoalition.
Theorem 11. K-MinCoalition is NP-hard for K ≥ 3.
Proof. First, define the set of coalitions with at most size K by N K {S ∈ 2 N : |S| ≤ K}. K-MinCoalition can be reduced from NP-hard problem (Exact-Cover-By-K-Sets), defined as follows. Given a collection G of subsets of N {1, ..., n}, each of size K, find a pairwise-disjoint sub-collection G that covers N , that is, S ∩ S = ∅ for all distinct S, S ∈ G and S∈G = N .
Given an instance G of Exact-Cover-By-K-Sets, we construct an instance of K-MinCoalition as follows. For S ∈ N K , we define c(S) as follows: One can check that (C1) and (C2) are satisfied. Now consider a feasible solution to K-MinCoalition and assume it consists of n i sets of size i not from G, for i = 1, ..., K, and n K sets of size K from G. Then the total cost of the solution is
this cost is uniquely minimized when n K = n/K, that is, when there is a disjoint collection from G covering N . Indeed, the minimum of linear relaxation of this integer programming problem is determined by the minimum ratio test: min min i∈{1,...,K−1}
On the other hand, if the answer to the instance G of Exact-Cover-By-K-Sets is NO, then this unique minimum cannot be achieved by an integral solution, yielding a solution of cost strictly larger than n K .
Conclusion
This paper considers a coalition formation game with a constraint on the maximum number of sharing participants per each coalition. This model can capture the problems in sharing economy, such as hotel room, taxi-ride and pass sharing problems. A number of cost sharing solutions are considered, wherein each participant is interested in joining a coalition with a lower payment in the respective cost sharing solution. We study stable coalitions, wherein no coalition of participants can deviate unilaterally to form lower cost coalitions, as the likely self-interested outcomes. We show that the strong Price of Anarchy (PoA) between a worst-case stable coalition and the social optimum for egalitarian and Nash solutions is O( √ K log K), whereas the one for equal-split, proportional-split, and usage based cost sharing (under monotone consumption condition or for pass sharing problem) is only Θ(log K), where K is the maximum capacity of sharing participants.
In future work, we may study other cost sharing solutions, such as Kalai-Smorodinsky solution from bargaining game. The PoA for egalitarian and Nash solutions (i.e., O( √ K log K)) is not known to be tight. It is interesting to see if the gap will be closed. Furthermore, the PoA for specific problems (e.g., hotel room, taxi-ride and pass sharing problems) may be strictly smaller than Θ(log K).
Proof. If there exists a cyclic preference, defined by (i 1 , ..., i s ) and (G 1 , ..., G s ), then
Summing the above equations, one obtains a contradiction 0 > 0. This completes the proof by Lemma 11. 
Theorem 9. For egalitarian cost sharing, there always exists a stable coalition structure.
Proof. If there exists a cyclic preference, then
